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Multiple ontologies of Alzheimer’s disease in Still Alice and A Song for Martin: A 
feminist visual studies of technoscience perspective 
 
Abstract 
The prevalence of dementia is increasing worldwide but there is still no hope of a cure. 
Huge resources go into biomedical research, whose reductive ‘enactment’ has severe 
consequences for women, who are predominantly affected by dementia. To challenge 
such tragic enactment, this article considers ‘multiple ontologies’ of the most common 
type of dementia – Alzheimer’s disease (AD) – in the popular fictional film adaptations 
Still Alice (2014) and A Song for Martin (En sång för Martin, 2000). Using a post-
humanist account of feminist visual studies of technoscience, this comparative film 
analysis reveals how gender supersedes AD oversteering the hierarchical dualisms 
between health and pathology, human and nonhuman, and biomedical and artistic modes 
of knowing about Alzheimer’s. The author argues that these films stress the potential of 
the arts (dramatic arts and music)—as a multisensorial post-humanist embodied state of 
becoming with AD, to challenge hierarchical dualisms and innovatively contribute to 
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Introduction 
Even though the ontological status of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) has been under 
constant scrutiny for some time (Commisso, 2015), it has been turned into a global ‘matter 
of concern’ built on the universal notion of the disease (Moser, 2008: 100). With common 
efforts from biomedical and pharmaceutical research, patients’ associations, and political 
agencies within the international Alzheimer’s movement (particularly in North America 
and Western European countries), the biomedical reality of AD has prevailed 
transnationally (Moser, 2008: 100). Epidemiological and political practices have 
consolidated the dominance of biomedical reality, naturalizing biomedical knowledges 
about Alzheimer’s and other dementias (ADD) (Moser, 2008). Thus, AD has been 
‘enacted’ (Mol, 2002: 33) as a fatal neurodegenerative brain disease that causes 60–70% 
of dementia cases but is not a normal part of ageing (WHO, 2017). Age is the main risk 
factor for AD, as most people get the diagnosis at the age of 65 or older (ALZ, 2016). 
Although already multiple, this enactment figures as universal, objective, and central 
scientific knowledge about AD. The most problematic aspect of such a dominant 




independent object, such as a gene or a brain, as locus of AD (Haraway, 1997: 142; 
Åsberg and Lum, 2010)1. Such an object becomes an ‘autotelic’ value-laden static ‘thing-
in-itself’, isolated from the body and the environment, a sort of denial surpassing the 
material and semiotic human and nonhuman relational practices that sustain the 
imaginary of this techno-scientific biomedical enactment (Haraway, 1997: 147, 137). The 
biomedical enactment reduces people with dementia to individuals with deteriorating 
cognitive deficiency, contributing to stigma that may trigger suicidal ideation, as 
Erlangsen et al. (2008) exemplifies. 
This enactment has severe consequences for women worldwide, who constitute 
the majority of people living with ADD and the majority of formal and informal dementia 
carers (GADAA). Women are under great psychological distress and pressure to leave or 
reduce paid work due to dementia care strain (GADAA). Åsberg and Lum (2010) find 
that the female brain in particular becomes a site for corporeal fetishist practices 
reinforcing hierarchical dualisms between sexes, ages, races, ethnicities, and species. 
Along with the involvement of nonhumans into biomedical AD research, these conditions 
figure AD a feminist materialist issue (Åsberg and Lum, 2010). However, Bartlett et al. 
(2016) have demonstrated that a feminist perspective on dementia is lacking in both 
research on dementia and national and international dementia policy guidelines. 






Consequently, this article contributes to feminist engagement with AD within a 
new field spearheaded by Åsberg and Lum (2010: 328): ‘Feminist visual studies of 
technoscience’. The aim is to demonstrate how biomedical fetishist practices reproduce 
hierarchical dualisms and unequal gendered dementia care relations. The central focus of 
the analysis is the popular fictional film adaptations Still Alice (2014) and A Song for 
Martin (2000), which engage ‘multiple ontologies’ of AD, acknowledging multisensorial 
ways of living with AD mostly explored in the arts (dramatic arts and music) for dementia 
care (Mol, 2002: 6). The article highlights that multisensorial ‘intra-active’ encounters 
between people with dementia, their next-of-kin, and nonhumans (art objects and 
instruments) inspire connectivity and empower agency (Barad, 2007: 353). These post-
humanist encounters dismantle biomedical fetishization practices (of the gene and the 
brain) oblivious to relational, embodied senses of becoming with AD. 
 
Theoretical approach, methods and materials 
Feminist visual studies of technoscience (FVST) are post-humanist, non-
representationalist, transdisciplinary studies that draw on intersections between cultural 
and visual studies, feminist cultural studies, and science and technology studies (Åsberg 
and Lum, 2010). Like feminist science studies, these studies criticize biological 
determinism, scientism, disembodiment, objectivization of bodies, and biological 




with the new materialist feminist studies that resist hierarchical dualisms between mind 
and matter, fiction and reality, visual and textual, arts and sciences, epistemology and 
ontology, human and nonhuman, and are committed to study practices. For this reason, I 
am particularly inspired by ‘praxiography’, a term coined by Mol (2002: 31), for studying 
how a disease multiplies in practices. That is, a disease such AD is being ‘done’—
‘enacted’ in practices—differently. In contrast to ‘perform’, which connotes a stage 
against which to view an action and its effects, ‘enact’ ‘leaves the actors vague’ and 
‘…suggests that in the act, and only then and there, something is—being enacted.’ (Mol, 
2002: 33). Thus, each enactment makes one definition of a disease possible. According 
to Mol (2002: 54–55), multiple enactments are not particularized, although they must 
hang out together to assure the unity of an organ, disease, and body. 
Knowing a disease is a matter of intervening into practices as they unfold, 
producing definitions while ‘intra-acting from within, and as part of, the phenomena 
produced’ (Barad, 2007: 56).  In contrast to ‘interaction’, an individualist term, ‘intra-
action’ does not presuppose pre-existence of already defined human or nonhuman actors 
(Barad, 2007: 89); rather, actors and their properties emerge in situated material-
discursive practices of becoming. These practices congeal agency as a materialized 
enactment of AD in particular space-time-matter (Barad, 2007). Thus, agency is not a 
property of human or nonhuman actors, but an intra-active open-ended performative 




is standard or ‘ill-fitted’ at all times (Haraway, 1997: 38), as we are all continuously 
entangled in relations that articulate who we are: our properties, boundaries, and 
connectivity. Multisensorial artistic encounters may provide a space for growth of all 
people engaged, regardless of AD or other health condition (Dupuis et al., 2016). 
Artistic encounters presuppose the involvement of multisensorial nonhuman 
agencies into our entangled state of becoming. To analyse such encounters, I find useful 
Bourriaud’s (2002: 84) ‘relational aesthetics’, which views art as a relational encounter 
between humans and art objects. In relational aesthetics, multisensorial embodied 
relations within art (dramatic art and music) collectively generate new knowledges and 
meanings about the world. Building on Guattari’s intentions, relational aesthetics moves 
human and social sciences away from hegemonic scientific paradigms towards ethical-
aesthetic paradigms (Bourriaud, 2002). This is significant because artistic material and 
sensuous modes of knowing have been devalued in the western history of philosophy and 
education, within which the arts have not been regarded as a form of knowledge (Eisener, 
2008). In addition, relational aesthetics follows Althusser’s materialist ‘trans-individual’ 
tradition (Bourriaud, 2002: 18), which fits well with post-humanist accounts of FVST, 
feminist materialist theories, and Barad’s understanding of agency (Lotherington, 2019).  
The non-representationalist approach, common to all these studies, allows the 
combination of visual and textual material into the analysis of film adaptations without a 




Although Still Alice and A Song for Martin contributed to the establishment of 
AD as a global matter of concern—reinforcing the Western/Euro-
American/biomedicalised/heterosexual/white/middle class/tragic vision of AD—they are 
valuable for analysis for several reasons. Both films emphasize the perspectives of 
women; as a people with AD (Alice in Still Alice) and next of kin (Barbara in A Song for 
Martin). The films depict life before and after AD diagnosis, in the first case of a fifty-
year-old woman with early-onset AD (Alice), in the second of a sixty-year-old man with 
AD (Martin), allowing fruitful comparative discussions on gender and differences in 
dementia care. In each film, via standard Hollywood narrative techniques, we witness a 
successful professional protagonist brought down by AD: in linguistics (Alice) and in 
musical composition and conducting (Martin). In both films, art is a catalyst of knowledge 
about AD in a relational aesthetic understanding of the world: dramatic arts in Still Alice 
(the relationship between mother and daughter – Alice and Lydia) and music in A Song 
for Martin (the relationship between spouses – Barbara and Martin). The films are 
adaptations from literature, giving me the opportunity to draw on the corresponding 
literary narratives (the novel Still Alice and the memoir The Book about E) whenever they 
provide additional insight into different AD enactments. Even though the films are 
produced in different socio-cultural environments (Still Alice in the US and A Song for 







AD enacted as an enviable skill, a success, and painful progress: Alice and Lydia 
Still Alice (2014) is an American drama written and directed by Richard Glatzer and Wash 
Westmoreland and based on Lisa Genova’s bestselling novel Still Alice (2015). Genova 
wrote the novel from a third-person perspective, prioritizing Alice’s point of view.  She 
and a team of women from the Alzheimer’s Association provided necessary knowledge 
on AD to Julianne Moore, who played Alice (NewsRx, 2015). With slight distinctions 
and in shorter form, the film adheres to the narrative of the novel. 
The focus of the story is the internationally honoured expert in linguistics Alice 
Howland, who is happily married to John, a biomedical researcher with whom she has 
three grown-up children: Anna, Tom and Lydia. The film starts with the celebration of 
Alice’s birthday, at which the whole Howland family is present except her youngest 
daughter Lydia. Alice is shining at the centre of the family while John toasts: ‘To the 
most beautiful and most intelligent woman I have known in my entire life!’ (SA 2014, 
1:57). While Anna is discussing with her husband whether Lydia has an acceptable reason 
for being absent – she has yet another TV audition – Alice assumes that they are speaking 
about her sister Anne. Alice doesn’t know why she has mismatched her deceased sister 
with Lydia, but this mistake appears to be one of the first signs of early-onset AD. Alice’s 




same disease is 100% if they have inherited the same gene mutation. While it turns out 
that Anna is positive and Tom is negative, Lydia never wanted to be tested: ‘Lydia always 
did things differently’ (Genova, 2015: 119). Lydia’s absence at the beginning of the film 
emphasizes her presence at the end, as she was the only family member to support Alice’s 
struggles with AD. AD comes to connect them and strengthen their relationship.  
I argue that, due to AD, Alice learns to respect the dramatic arts as Lydia’s career 
choice because she understands the value of the arts for life. In the intra-active relational 
artistic encounters that generate Kushner’s drama play Angels in America, Alice feels 
Lydia and recognizes her talent, while Lydia perceives Alice’s inability to speak as an 
‘enviable skill’ (Genova, 2015: 191). While Alice’s personal relationship with Lydia 
grows inspiring agency, her marriage to John falters. John embodies the biomedical 
enactment of AD and its failure (Falcus, 2014). The failure of the biomedical enactment 
is underlined by the circumstance in which Alice becomes affected by AD in her fifties. 
Although the film emphasizes the power of dramatic arts for differential becoming with 
AD, it also normalizes the biomedical ontology of AD as a dreadful communicable 
disease—caused by a mutant gene. This ontology, which excludes living matter and its 
perceptual and personal relations with the environment, reproduces stigma and feelings 
of guilt, pushing Alice to suicide. 
After Alice forgets to say the word ‘lexicon’ during a guest lecture at California 




Alice admires Anna and Tom for pursuing ‘real careers’ in law and medicine, she is 
convinced that Lydia is wasting her valuable time by acting in theatrical shows in LA (SA 
2014, 7:23). Alice’s frustration grows when she realizes that John is financing Lydia’s 
acting. Alice and Lydia’s meeting culminates in the usual stony-faced silence: Alice 
wants Lydia to go to college, Lydia confidently resists. However, the camera ends the 
discussion focused on Lydia, supporting her point of view.  
The major qualities that Alice cherishes in herself are her performances as a 
researcher and professor (Genova, 2015). Once affected by AD, she acknowledges 
sensuous ways of being in the world, mostly explored in arts that move beyond cognitive 
reasoning. Her ability to learn from AD is a courageous one, if we think about the ‘great 
fall’ that she experiences from internationally prized scholar in linguistics, teaching about 
the essence of language for communication (SA, 2014), to a dementia patient who loses 
her ability to speak. Genova (2015) describes this fall as causing Alice to feel less and 
less human, assuming that the ability to use language distinguishes humans from 
nonhumans. However, animal and disability studies oppose this distinction, revealing 
different, less rational ways of knowing, which function outside of logo-centric 
discourses (Åsberg et al., 2011). For instance, Weil (2006) describes how embodied 
feelings of touch and body language in human–nonhuman and animal–machine 
entanglements enable new sight built on compassion and communion. These material 




univocal constructions of reality that privilege word over matter and exclude 
‘nonhumans’ from conversations. In contrast, ‘otherworldly conversations’ (Haraway, 
2008: 157), which emerge in human–nonhuman animal encounters without appropriating 
and objectifying nonhuman animals, are respectful to differences, because none of the 
parties is ever the same after the encounter. In my adaptation of the ‘otherworldly 
conversations’ concept I also include other human–nonhuman relations that materialize 
connectivity in a multisensorial intertwinement of perceptual feelings. A photograph of 
Lydia with a dolphin illustrates that she has the ability to conduct such otherworldly 
conversations with nonhuman animals, using broad vocal and non-verbal signs for 
communication (SA, 2014). The film elicits otherworldly conversations between Lydia 
and Alice while discussing the play, in a material, intra-active process of remembering 
and forgetting. Flashing word mistakes do not really matter in their conversation where 
gesticulation and body expression convey feelings. We see how the play in a relational 
aesthetic encounter creates a world-in-themselves, and an environment of shared 
experiences and sorrow for friends who died from AIDS. (Latimer, 2012). Conversations 
during these encounters change Alice’s perception of AD. In addition, reviewing and 
analysing plays with Lydia buttresses Alice’s memory and enables her to see the depth of 
Lydia’s intellect and to love her (Genova, 2015). Simultaneously, Lydia can practice her 




As her ability to track what was said in complex conversations with many participants declined, Alice’s 
sensitivity to what wasn’t said, to body language and unspoken feelings, had heightened. …[Lydia’d] 
said that she and other actors had to focus extremely hard to divorce themselves from verbal language 
in an effort to be honestly affected by what the other actors were doing and feeling. Alice didn’t quite 
understand the distinction, but she loved Lydia for seeing her handicap as an enviable skill. (Genova, 
2015: 191) 
The film confirms that in her relationship with Lydia, Alice is ‘differently abled’ to 
articulate herself by other creative means than verbal language (Moser, 2000: 210). Their 
relationship remains reciprocal, unconditional, and personal, as Lydia decides to share 
her diary with Alice and have ‘no secrets’ from her. (SA, 2014, 56:24). Lydia is also the 
only one who asks Alice what it is like to have AD, and she accepts Alice’s lived 
experience as a valid definition of the disease. 
Their mutual becoming with AD inspires Alice’s personal speech at the 
Alzheimer’s Association conference, which enacts AD as a success (SA, 2014). In 
contrast to her previous frequent talks worldwide about language, Alice believes this is 
‘the most influential’ speech of her life (Genova, 2015: 284), as she is at centre stage 
talking about her experience of living with the disease (SA, 2014). She reveals that she 
would not like to be regarded as a victim of AD; she is, rather, engaged in a constant 
struggle to ‘stay connected’ and appreciate the pleasures of life in moments that matter 
(SA, 2014: 01:07). Her speech is explicitly political because she insists that people with 




themselves; ‘they’ are part of ‘us‘, and who they become is co-constituted in an intra-
active material-discursive process of becoming with us. The agency that emerges in this 
intra-active process never ends (Barad, 2007: 235). There are always new possibilities to 
matter, as Alice demonstrates in an entangled becoming with a marker and papers and 
audience waiting to be touched. 
Towards the end of the film, as Alice’s short-term memory and ability to use 
verbal language declines, we see Alice and Lydia immersed in the play. They sit near 
each other. Alice absorbs silent movements of Lydia’s lisps and eyewinks: 
Nothing’s lost forever. In this world, there is a kind of painful progress. Longing for what we’ve left 
behind, and dreaming ahead.’ (my emphasis, 2014, 1:29:27; Angels in America, 2013: 300).  
This monumental scene reveals that past and future are ‘enfolded participants’ larger than 
any individual (Barad, 2007: ix). There is no way to leave the past behind, as the past is 
writing the universe in its differential becoming, and the future is always present as an 
agential possibility. Lydia and Alice’s conversation enacts AD as a painful progress 
required also for other endeavours in life. In an ‘affective space’—presence of charged 
feelings of immediate closeness with Lydia—Alice feels and comprehends ‘love’ 
(Cataldi, 1993: 130). The intertwinement of touch, vision, and hearing embedded in the 
environment demolishes the epistemic priority of vision as the dominant sense for reason 
and construction of reality (Cataldi, 1993). 
In contrast to the relationship with Lydia that enables growth, concealing the 




biomedical imaginary around the disease. The film shows John avoiding watching Alice 
taking her pill dispenser and, later, looking at her with his ‘clinical eye’, objectifying her 
as one of his rats in cancer research (Genova, 2015: 151). The clinical gaze embodies 
biomedical normalisation practices that turn lived bodies into patients and objects of 
research (Foucault, 2003) with fixed boundaries, and cut off relational human–nonhuman 
‘naturalsocial’ intra-active practices, replacing them with one ‘seemingly objective thing’ 
(Haraway, 1997: 143; 142). In a neurologist’s office—where Alice and John learn Alice 
might have inherited a mutation gene from her father, and possibly transferred it to her 
children—the gene as a fixed, self-generated entity becomes the most dreadful ‘thing’ to 
‘have’, concealing the monstrous communicable disease of AD. The gene obtains the 
power to decide which lives are liveable and worth bringing to life (SA, 2014; Genova, 
2015).2 Without questioning the biomedical ‘technobiopower’ and its urge to establish 
control over ‘life itself’ (Haraway, 1997: 161; 137), the film normalizes the biomedical 
reality of AD and the related stigma. Alice feels guilty ‘having’ the mutation gene, and 
hates her father for ‘transferring’ it to her. Her children might hate her too, particularly 
Anna, who distances herself increasingly from her mother. Alice would rather have 
cancer than AD, as she would not feel like a social outcast (SA, 2014). John hates that AD 
is happening to them too, as he cannot bear staying with Alice and facing her decline. He 
decides to take advantage of a job opportunity in Minnesota, leaving Alice at home with 





Lydia and caretaker Elena. John’s inability to handle AD concludes with his cry at the 
end when he admits to Lydia: ‘You’re a better man than I am’ (SA, 2014: 1:26:09). 
Genova (2015: 263) hints that perhaps John’s reaction to Alice’s AD triggers her decline, 
as he leaves her before she leaves him. After visiting a nursing home, where she cannot 
imagine herself living, Alice sets up cognitive criteria for suicide. However, as the title 
of the film suggests, Alice remains present in physical and emotional relations with her 
family, especially with Lydia (Falcus, 2014). 
 
AD enacted as creative force, kiss and touch: Martin and Barbara 
A Song for Martin (2000) is a Swedish drama directed by Bille August based on Ulla 
Isaksson’s memoir The Book about E (Boken om E, 1995). In her memoir, the well-known 
Swedish screenplay writer elucidates how AD shook the last five years of her marriage 
with literary critic Erik Hjalmar Linder. The film constructs the same narrative in a shorter 
form, following middle-aged music professionals, Barbara and Martin. 
The focus of the story is orchestral concertmaster Barbara Hartman, who falls in 
love with the famous composer Martin Fisher and divorces her husband, with whom she 
has two grown-up children, to marry and live with Martin in creative symbiosis. Barbara 
mentions what a ‘great experience’ it is for her to play Martin’s music (ASfM 2000, 6:32). 
As concertmaster, she improved Martin’s compositions, giving him fruitful comments 




life’ (Isaksson, 1995: 75). To feel secure in his love, Barbara asks Martin to promise that 
he will never leave her and that they will always be honest and sincere with each other. 
As Martin gets AD diagnosis, Barbara is the first one to break the promise. AD comes to 
change the dynamic of their relationship and put their love on test. Barbara’s patronizing 
behaviour and feelings of distrust, defeat, and negligence separate Martin from Barbara 
under a ‘comfort blanket’ (livstäcket) that he keeps just for himself: ‘He feels all the time 
that the comfort blanket is going to slide off him and that he must grab it again and again 
and try to hold it still’ (Isaksson, 1995: 141).3 Their collaboration ceases as Martin turns 
his resentment and anger on Barbara, whose life fades into the shadows because of pain 
and guilt that she feels. Although Martin does not allow Barbara to transcribe his opera, 
working on it brings Barbara back to life, keeping his presence still vivid.  
I argue that, although AD causes both the emotional and, eventually, the physical 
separation of Martin and Barbara, this does not imply that their relationship is lost. Music 
strengthens their relationship and sustains their connections with the world. In an intra-
active multisensorial encounter between Martin, the piano, and Barbara, AD is enacted 
as kiss and touch. In addition, the film shows how Mozart’s opera The Magic Flute 
triggers Martins’ participation as a conductor, enacting AD as a creative force. While 
violin playing helps Barbara to overcome AD and her dependence on Martin, playing the 
piano reminds Martin of loss, so as the AD progresses he stops composing. Nevertheless, 





his opera is constructed as a ‘distributed achievement’ of collective care agencies: 
Barbara, Martin’s manager, Martin’s daughter, and a philharmonic orchestra (Ursin and 
Lotherington, 2018: 62). The film also showcases Barbara as more affected with AD than 
Martin, defeating the biomedical enactment of the disease. 
The first argument is illustrated in a scene in a neurologist’s office in which she 
shows Barbara an image of Martin’s ‘deteriorated’ brain juxtaposed with a ‘healthy’ 
brain. In the medical imaginary, the brain becomes a self-sufficient organ for the 
naturalization of ‘“appropriate” human subjectivity’ (Åsberg and Lum, 2010: 333). The 
healthy brain is commonly an embodiment of white, middle-class, Western, male 
humanness, an authoritative rational subject in control of own body and of relations with 
distanced others and the environment (Åsberg and Lum, 2010). This imaginary reinforces 
hierarchical dualisms between body and mind, subject and object, human and nonhuman, 
and excludes all who misfit the ‘able-bodied’ world. Åsberg and Lum (2010: 331) 
demonstrate how the brain as a fetish ‘obscures the other ongoing material processes and 
the cultural work that it takes to sustain this racialized and gendered understanding of 
human identity’. The neurologist advises Barbara: ‘I think it’s best if you try to see that 
Mr. Fisher is no longer your husband. Not the man you’ve been married to’ (ASfM 2000, 
1:36:36). The camera emphasizes her amazement with a close up on her face that reveals 
disapproval and accusation. Her husband and the man she has always admired, Martin, is 




Barbara invites Martin to sit in front of his piano and his handwritten compositions in 
their house. She plays the symphony from the concert when they met and fell in love. 
‘Play, Martin’, she says, placing his hands on the piano (ASfM 2000, 1:38:34). In this 
intra-active multisensorial encounter, Martin pronounces Barbara’s name. Barbara’s 
touch and kiss awakens its meaning—that she is his wife. 
Field (2014) remarks that touch is the first of all the senses developed through 
human evolution and it is disproportionally allocated throughout the whole skin, but 
increased in the lips and fingertips. Although acknowledged as the first and most general 
sense, touch never held the privilege of a ‘superior intellectual’ sense like sight and 
hearing – and its meaning was gendered (Korsmeyer, 2004: 86). Together with taste and 
smell, touch belongs to the ‘lower bodily animal’ senses that are embodied physically in 
the environment, in contrast to sight and hearing, which function in proximity, at a 
distance from the environment (Korsmeyer, 2004: 87). Therefore, touch disrupts the 
dominant, reflective, masculinist ‘economy of gaze’ that favours detachment, clearness 
of sight, and completeness (Shildrick, 2001: 393, 2); a scientific, disembodied, infinite, 
and fixed vision characteristic of ‘male supremacy’ (Haraway, 1991: 188). In contrast, 
situated vision and mutual touch acknowledge processes of becoming-together as 
changeable bodies and minds, always fluid, leaky and in partial differential connections 
(Shildrick, 2001). Therefore, the five senses never function in isolation, they constantly 




in the multisensorial embodied experience of touching, seeing, hearing, smelling, and 
even tasting (Fürst, 2014).  Their relationship rests on reciprocal and lucid moments when 
they ‘communicate with each other beyond words and habitual caresses...’ (Isaksson, 
1995: 130). Even though Barbara has packed away all her memories of their past life from 
her everyday life, ‘everything still remains’ (ASfM 2000, 1:45:50). Memories are not 
written in individual brains, but in ‘enfoldings of space-time-matter written into the 
universe’ (Barad, 2007: ix). 
How we learn to enact our everyday practices, and how we remember ourselves 
entangled in those practices, is not just registered in the brain, but also in our skin, hands, 
fingers, legs, and other parts of the body and environment (Mortimer-Sandilands, 2008). 
This claim is supported in a scene in which Barbara takes Martin to see the Mozart’s 
opera The Magic Flute (ASfM 2000, 1:12:10). On the way there, Barbara reminds Martin 
how he was fascinated by a certain passage in the opera played in a minor key. Martin 
does not know what Barbara is talking about, drawing attention to the moose-crossing 
sign that appears on the road for a moment. However, in the opera hall, he hears the 
passage in question: 
PAMINA: Wherever you go, I shall be at your side. – I myself shall lead you – Love is my guide …[ 
Pamina hands the magic flute to Tamino to help them pass all trials]… She will strew the way with 






Martin immediately stands up, singing loudly and conducting excitedly: 
In a magic hour, my father cut it from the deepest roots of a thousand-year-old oak amid thunder, 
lightning – storm and rain. – Come, now, and play the flute! It will guide us on the dread path (ASfM 
2000, 1:13:50; The Magic Flute, 32, my emphasis) 
The irony is that his participation and joy, his awakening, breaks the illusion of the play 
on-stage.  Martins’ artistic elation is a ‘matter out of place’, so Barbara tries to calm him 
down (Douglas, 2003: 36). She drags Martin out of the auditorium, confused like a child, 
as a flash of painful remembrance arises in which he held the central place on the stage. 
We are invited to empathize with Martin and his struggle to stay connected. The audience 
in the auditorium is not aware that another love scene between Tamino and Pamina is 
happening right among them. The magic flute in Mozart’s opera embodies the power of 
music to keep Martin and Barbara’s relationship alive. The opera passage demonstrates 
the ‘aliveness’ of matter, active in its materialisation (Barad, 2007: 33). Mortimer-
Sandilands (2008) notes that, in particular, kinesthetic memory and perceptual relations 
between people with dementia and their environment (i.e., bodily motions and rhythm) 
remain active even when cognitive memory and reflexive relations undermine them. In 
this way, Martin’s further participation in the opera is constrained by cultural context and 
norms, and Barbara feels they are not ‘normal people’ anymore (ASfM 2000, 1:14:55). 
They must leave the last place Martin could still truly feel connected, as his enabled 
connectivity contributes to stigma around AD. The passage from the opera enacts AD a 




relatedness’ (Vaittinen, 2015:113). This opening-up ‘breaks down’ the illusion of ‘normal 
able-bodied’ embodiment, revealing its co-constitutive political relatedness with the 
‘disabled’ body in need (Barad, 2007:158). However, such co-constitutive relations may 
end up in care, neglect, or exclusion, as in this case. 
Although violin playing helps Barbara to overcome AD, as writing does for 
Isaksson (1995: 15), ‘[i]t was never like “writing” – it was like vomiting or screaming’. 
When Isaksson (1995: 15) finished writing, she would ‘flush it down the toilet’ and 
immediately forget what she had written, because it was shameful to remember such 
‘excrement’. Likewise, the penetrating and shrill sound of Barbara’s violin imitates 
Isakson’s painful writing in an attempt to express her despair. In contrast, Martin could 
not continue to play. In self-defence, deprived of work and the joy of composing music, 
he destroys their transcripts and breaks the neck of Barbara’s violin – ‘her fingers’ (ASfM 
2000, 1:25:35). Barbara beats Martin and runs out barefoot to a nearby forest. She 
stretches her arms upwards against a hard pine trunk, tearing her palms against the rough 
bark while screaming into the sky (ASfM 2000, Isaksson, 1995).  
Barbara’s fear of speaking out about violence is due to her internalization of guilt 
in the normalization practices of symbolic domestic violence, in which the dominance of 
men is legitimized (Bourdieu, 2004; Thapat-Björket et al., 2016). Her resistance is an 
adaptation to the situation, and self-harm is a way for her to establish control over her 




Enander & Holmberg, 2008). Her subservient role, apparent throughout, further 
strengthens the progression of AD. Barbara sacrifices her life to one man at the centre of 
her universe, who accuses her of deceit and inadequate care. ‘You are the biggest and the 
most beautiful man on this earth, Martin!’, she says at the very end (ASfM 2000, 1:48:32). 
She puts her career on hold to care for Martin and work on his opera. She sees his success 
as her own success. She returns to playing violin in the orchestra only after Martin is 
hospitalized. Nonetheless, Martin does not acknowledge Barbara’s care, as if care is self-
evident for women (Allen, 1996). Martin physically confronts Barbara in front of 
witnesses and leaves for further investigation. On the way to hospital, he accuses her: 
‘You betrayed me’ (ASfM 2000, 1:29:13). He relies more on institutional care than on 
Barbara’s care at home because in the nursing home he is relieved of her expectations. 
He also wants Barbara to continue with a new life: his gesture is, as Martin’s daughter 
Elisabeth comforts Barbara – ‘the last care for her’ (ASfM 2000, 1:33:46).  
 
Comparative analysis and discussion  
Both films showcase that Alice and Martin are dealing with their disease more confidently 
than John and Barbara. However, while Martin and Barbara share feelings of isolation 
and stigma, Alice mostly experiences those feelings alone. In contrast to Martin, Alice 
feels the financial and emotional burden of caring and cannot imagine life in a nursing 




home and in nursing homes that both films depict. Furthermore, Martin does not consider 
suicide an option as Alice does, but he does almost drown Barbara during her attempt to 
save him on their holiday in Morocco. Martin is aggressive towards Barbara—he breaks 
her violin, her only way of fighting AD; Alice is aggressive towards herself. Nevertheless, 
neither Alice nor Martin can enact their practices efficiently after being affected by AD—
Alice stops teaching, Martin stops composing. Via multisensorial relational encounters 
with and through dramatic art (Alice, Angels in America, Lydia) music (Martin, The 
Magic Flute, Barbara), and instruments (piano, violin, marker) they became differently 
abled to communicate. Yet, in contrast to Alice’s reciprocal, unconditional relationship 
with Lydia, Barbara’s relationship with Martin remains uneven, perhaps explaining why 
they do not manage to finish his opera together. 
The comparative analysis reveals that gender supersedes AD. It is not just that 
John’s treatment of Alice, which embodies biomedical fetishist practices, is gendered and 
gendering, but also that these practices are not present in Barbara’s carrying of Martin 
(Vaittinen, 2017). Barbara invites Martin to see The Magic Flute and engages to finish 
‘his opera’ (ASfM 2000, 1:47:23). Johan leaves to take on a new job opportunity. Barbara 
stops working as a concertmaster. Devaluing sensuous relational becoming with AD 
under cognitive mastery—something her husband appreciates most—Alice wants to kill 




Even so, Alice and Barbara are keen to maintain their relationships with John and 
Martin, who conversely avoid sharing feelings with their spouses. Both John and Martin 
retain authority in their relationships and stand in an ambiguous relation to care as a 
corporeal relation (Vaittinen, 2017). Martin does not acknowledge care from Barbara—
John refuses to care for Alice. Their stereotypically gendered approach to care has severe 
material consequences for Alice and Barbara’s bodies. 
Hence, both films reveal how gendered binaries and practices of dementia care 
repeat themselves iteratively, co-constituting uneven spousal gender relations and 
reproducing societal norms and expectations, consistently affecting women’s bodies 
more than men’s, both as people with dementia and as next-of-kin. This coincides with 
research finding that female next-of-kin feel a greater burden of care than male next-of-
kin (Pöysti et al., 2012) while men with dementia show more aggressive behaviours 
(Gibbons et al., 2014). Consequently, both films demonstrate structurally the 
performative repetition of hierarchical modes of knowing AD, whereas artistic modes of 
knowing AD do not matter to neoliberal economies as the biomedical ones. This is 
consequential for how we think about ADD and live or die with the disease. 
 
Conclusion 
Both Still Alice and A Song for Martin represent living with AD as dreadful and 




the embodied and situated nature of the disease and its power to connect and strengthen 
but also dissolve relationships. The biomedical enactment of AD as a dreadful 
neurodegenerative disease is embedded in the narratives, yet it does not have to be. 
The mutated gene and the deteriorating brain as fetish appear as just one possible 
enactment of AD: unliveable ontologies that lead to a dread path. The film demonstrates 
that different socio-material relations, combining nonhuman and human agencies in 
concrete time-space-matter, participate in the ‘mattering’ of the disease. 
Biomedical ontologies do not come to ‘matter’ in relationships that entail 
relational, multisensorial encounters between human and nonhuman agencies in the 
embodied state of becoming with the disease. In particular, nonhuman–human 
multisensuous intra-actions in artistic encounters acknowledge multiple post-human 
modes of becoming with AD that challenge binaries of body and mind, passive and active, 
human and nonhuman. These encounters may innovatively contribute to dementia care, 
expanding space for agency and connectivity. 
 
Notes 
1. Haraway’s (1997: 142) concept of ‘corporeal fetishism’ that Åsberg and Lum (2010: 342) utilize  
stresses the biomedical focus on the examination of the brain and its internal ‘micro-biological  
puzzle-solving’ processes in search of a cure (Moser, 2008). From Marxist theories, Haraway 
draws on ‘commodity fetishism’, the objectification and investment of value into one thing, such 




disavowal, which requires balancing between knowledge and beliefs. The object of desire becomes 
a master of ‘life itself’ while a fetishist is aware of (his) false investments—he both desires and 
fears losing control over the ‘switch’ (Haraway, 1997: 144, 146). In her elaboration of ‘corporeal 
gene fetishism’ in comparison to commodity fetishism, Haraway (1997) includes nonhuman 
actions (not just actors involved), and in comparison, to psychoanalytical fetishism, gives a 
feminist critique from the standpoint of a woman. 
2. Alice asks herself if she would have conceived her children if she had known that she was caring 
the ‘deformed gene’ (Genova, 2015: 115). Anna ‘saves’ her babies from the dreadful gene through 
pre-insemination genetic testing of the embryos (SA, 2014; Genova, 2015) 
3. Both memoir and film are originally in Swedish and all translations are mine. 
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